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The Bankruptcy Code largely exists to provide a
"fresh start" to debtors. But not everyone gets a free
pass. If a debtor has intentionally lied in order to
obtain money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, he receives no
protection. However, there is an exception built into the
code to protect debtors from predatory lenders intent on
gaming the system in an effort to eliminate insolvency
risk. The size of this exception has become a matter of
judicial debate over the past thirty-eight years as a
circuit split has slowly developed over the
interpretation of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) & (B)'s
"statementrespecting.., financial condition." Early in
2017, the Eleventh Circuit weighed in for the first time,
reversing a recent trend of circuit court decisions that
have effectively limited the protections against
predatory lenders in an effort to protect vulnerable
lenders from fraudulent debtors. This Note advocates
for a return to the broader interpretation of "statement
respecting a debtor's financial condition," a position
that, prior to the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in
Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP, had lacked
any significant support in recent jurisprudence, by
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squarely addressing and rebutting the most widely
raisedarguments in favor of a narrow interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The legal concept of "clean hands" has long played a significant
role in the discharge of debt through bankruptcy in the United
States.1 Although the Bankruptcy Code largely exists to provide a
2
"fresh start" to debtors, this policy is not without limitation.
There are a number of exceptions to the discharge of debt-the
"fresh start" guaranteed by the Code-for liabilities incurred
One such exception
through intentional, wrongful conduct. 3
renders any debt obtained by fraud nondischargeable. 4 Simply
put, the Bankruptcy Code will not protect a debtor who has
intentionally lied in order to obtain "money, property, services, or
5
an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit."
The
However, there is an exception to the exemption.
Bankruptcy Code will not allow the discharge of debt obtained by
fraud unless the false representation was a "statement respecting
the debtor's ... financial condition." 6 It is this exception to the
exception that has been the focus of numerous cases over the last
three decades and serves as the basis for this Note.
Consider the following case. Early in 2016, a federal district
court in the Middle District of Georgia decided Appling v. Lamar,
Archer & Cofrin, LLP.7 In this appeal, the appellant debtor,
Appling, had purchased a business that turned out to be a sham.
When he learned the seller had misrepresented the financial
condition of the business, he hired the appellee Lamar, Archer &
Cofrin, LLP to represent him.8
Approximately a year after hiring the firm, Appling had
accumulated over $60,000 in unpaid legal fees. 9 After the firm

1 Anthony M. Sabino, Preventing an Alchemy of Evil: Preserving the Nondischargeability
of a Debt Obtained by Fraud, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 99, 100-01 (2003).
2 See Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 2012) (pointing to 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B) as constraints on the "fresh start" policy).
3 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPrCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 57:14, Westlaw (database updated July 2017).
4 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
5Id.
6

Id.

7 No. 3:15-CV-031 (CAR), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39958 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2016), rev'd,

848 F.3d 953 (l1th Cir. 2017).
8 Id. at *2.
9 Id.
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threatened to terminate representation and file an attorney's lien
against Appling if fees were not brought current, the parties
agreed to meet. At the meeting, Appling represented that he was
set to receive a tax refund of approximately $100,000 and that he
would use the refund to bring his account with the firm current.
Based on this representation, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin agreed to
continue representing Appling. 10
Approximately eight months after the initial meetings, the
parties again met to discuss the unpaid fees and again Appling
promised to use the refund to pay the firm, despite knowing that
his refund would be substantially less than he originally
represented.1 1 The matter for which Appling hired the firm settled
a little over six months later and Lamar, Archer & Cofrin
demanded payment from Appling. In response, Appling informed
the firm that he had used the refund to prop up his business under
the advisement of his bankruptcy attorney. The firm eventually
sued Appling and obtained a judgment for a little over $100,000.12
Within a few months, Appling filed for bankruptcy.
The question before the district court was whether Appling's
false representation that he would use his tax refund to pay his
attorneys was a "'statement respecting [his] financial condition'
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)?" 13 If the answer is yes, Appling's
debts are dischargeable and Appling gets the "fresh start" offered
by the Bankruptcy Code.
However, if Appling's false
representation was not a "statement respecting [his] ...financial
condition," Appling receives no protection for the legal fees owed
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin.
While the text of the statute is simple, the court's decision was
difficult for two reasons. First, there is a divergence of opinion as
to how to interpret the phrase in § 523(a)(2). 14 And second, the
10Id. at *3.
11Id. at *3-4. Five months before the meeting, Appling signed his amended tax return
requesting a refund of only $60,718. Further, a couple of weeks before the meeting, Appling
received the refund check from the I.R.S. in the amount of $59,851. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at *5.
14 See id. at *7 ("Courts disagree whether to construe the phrase 'respecting the
debtor's ... financial condition' broadly or strictly."); see also Joanna L. Radmall, Dishonest
Debtors and DischargeableDebts in Bankruptcy: An Analysis of the Circuit Split Regarding
the Interpretationof 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)s Respecting the Debtor's ...Financial Condition,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 841, 841-42 (explaining that, under the broad view, a debtor's reference
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Eleventh Circuit at the
majority of circuit courts, including the 15
time, had not directly addressed the issue.
The district court sided with the law firm-taking a narrow
view of the phrase in determining that Appling's representations
were not "statements respecting [his] ...financial condition"
because they "involved a single asset rather than [his] net worth,
16
overall financial health, or equation of assets and liabilities."
This decision followed a significant shift in the interpretive
approach taken by courts when deciding cases under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). Historically, a majority of courts followed a
broad approach, but at the time of the decision in 2016, the
opposite was true.1 7 Thus, the further removed from the time of
the enactment of the statute,1 8 the more courts had shifted to a
narrow interpretation.
This trend, however, hit a wall early in 2017 when the Eleventh
Circuit considered Appling on appeal and reversed the district
court's decision. 19 The court determined that, based on the text
and context, a single asset can be a "statement respecting the
debtor's... financial condition." 20 "When the language of the
21
statute is clear, we need not look any further," wrote the court.
"A distaste for dishonest debtors does not empower judges to
22
disregard the text of the statute."
This Note advocates for a return to the broad interpretation of
§ 523(a)(2)'s "statements respecting a debtor's financial condition,"
a position that, prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Appling,
lacked significant support in recent jurisprudence. While others
to ownership of a specific asset is a "statement respecting ... financial condition," while the
narrow view requires a "complete asset and liability run-down from the debtor"; and
recognizing the existence of a third view-the "modified-expansive" view-that serves as a
middle ground between the narrow and broad).
15 See Appling, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39958, at *8 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit has
yet to address the issue and citing the decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth as
the only circuit courts that have).
16 Id. at *12.
17 Id. at *7-8.
18 The current form of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) was first enacted in 1978. See infra note 81
and accompanying text.
19Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (In re Appling), 848 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2017),
cert. granted (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (No. 16-1215).
20 Id. at 957-58.
21 Id. at 960.
22 Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss1/10

6

Sandifer: Easy Credit and the Erosion of Dischargeable Debt in Bankruptcy:

2017]

ADVOCATING FOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION

313

have weighed in on this longstanding interpretative split,23 noting
the judicial arguments made on both sides, a substantial defense
of the broad interpretation has not been raised. This Note fills the
void by squarely addressing and rebutting the most widely raised
arguments in favor of a narrow interpretation. Accordingly, Part
II of this Note provides context to the discussion by exploring the
statute and the circuit court split that has developed around it.
Part III analyzes and rebuts the four predominant arguments that
courts have found persuasive in taking a narrow or strict approach
to the statute. Finally, Part IV revisits the Appling case and
advocates for a step back toward the historical, broad
interpretation of "statement respecting ...financial condition."
II.BACKGROUND
A. THE STATUTE

Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lists nineteen exceptions
to the discharge of debt in bankruptcy. 24 These exceptions can be
grouped into four categories: (1) governmental liabilities, (2)
liabilities incurred through fault, (3) obligations arising from
divorce or separation agreement, and (4) liabilities excepted for
purposes related to bankruptcy administration. 25
Section
523(a)(2)(A) and (B) address the discharge of liabilities incurred
through intentional misconduct-specifically, fraud. Under these
provisions, filing for bankruptcy does not discharge an individual
debtor for any debt:
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained
by-

23 Compare Radmall, supra note 14 (describing the circuit split and advocating for a
modified-expansive view), with Mallory Velten, Debtors as Predators: The Proper
Interpretationof 'A Statement Respecting the Debtor's... Financial Condition" in 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B), 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV.J. 583 (2014) (citing more recent judicial
decisions and advocating for a narrow view).
24 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)-(19) (2012); Velten, supra note 23, at 585.
26 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 3, § 57:1.
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(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud, other than a statement respecting
the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the
debtor is liable for such money, property,
services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or

published with intent to deceive.

. . .26

A creditor seeking relief under § 523(a)(2)(A) or (B) of the
Bankruptcy Code must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the five elements of fraud: misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity,
intent to defraud, reliance (either justifiable or reasonable), and
27
There are,
resulting damage (in this case, unpaid debt).
however, two significant differences between the elements of
§ 523(a)(2)(B) and those of (A). Under subsection (B), a statement
"respecting the debtor's ... financial condition" must have been (1)
in writing, and (2) reasonably, rather than justifiably (a lower
28 Because of these
standard used in subsection (A)), relied upon.
differences, it is important to understand the types of false
statements that should be funneled through § 523(a)(2)(B) and
those that will be left for adjudication under § 523(a)(2)(A).
The phrase, "respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial29
condition," appears in both subsections (A) and (B) of § 523(a)(2).
Because the same phrase appears in both subsections and those
subsections were enacted as part of the same amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code, it is clear that the phrase should have the same
Thus, any statement
meaning in § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). 30
determined to be "respecting a debtor's. . . financial condition" for

26

11

U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)-(B).

27 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 3, § 57:15.

2 Id.
29 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(2).
30 Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 704 (10th Cir. 2005).
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purposes of subsection (B) must also be a statement "respecting a
debtor's... financial condition" for purposes of subsection (A).
Further, any false representation made by a debtor is either a
"statement respecting ...financial condition," or it is not-"[the]
statutory dichotomy is absolute." 31 Therefore, it cannot be said
that liabilities incurred by a fraudulent oral statement determined
to
be
"respecting ...financial
condition"
are
somehow
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).
A fraudulent oral
statement "respecting ...financial condition" must be an
exception to subsection (A).
The problems created by the structure and text of the statute
are evident. When a debtor intentionally provides a false written
statement related to his financial condition to obtain credit, the
debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(B). However, if the
same debtor makes a false oral statement related to his financial
condition in order to obtain credit, the debt is dischargeable as an
32
exception under § 523(a)(2)(A).
Thus, courts are left with a difficult task-defining a
"statement respecting the debtor's ... financial condition." If
courts interpret the phrase broadly, allowing a greater number of
false written statements to be funneled through elements of
§ 523(a)(2)(B), a greater number of false oral statements will
remain dischargeable under the Code.
However, if courts
interpret the phrase more narrowly, fewer false oral statements
will be dischargeable, but the impact of § 523(a)(2)(B) will be
significantly diminished. Neither option is the obvious choice. As a
result, a split has developed among the federal circuit and district
courts.
B. A DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION

Over the past thirty-eight years, a circuit split has slowly
developed over the interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and
(B)'s "statement respecting.., financial condition." Prior to the
Appling decision, only three circuit courts-the Fourth, Fifth, and
Tenth-had squarely decided the issue.
31

Zimmerman v. Soderlund (In re Soderlund), 197 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).

32

See NORTON & NORTON, supra note 3, § 57:18

("[O]nly fraudulent written statements

relating to financial condition lead to a nondischargeable debt.").
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1. The Fourth Circuit's Broad Approach. In 1984, the Fourth
Circuit became the first circuit court to weigh in when it decided
Engler v. Van Steinburg.3 3 In that case, the creditor, Engler, had
loaned the debtor, Van Steinburg, $5,500. 34 In addition to holding
a security interest in Van Steinburg's livestock and farm
equipment, Engler had received oral assurances from Van
Steinburg that he would also have a first priority security interest
in his property, despite Van Steinburg's knowledge that other
creditors held superior liens. 35 After Van Steinburg filed for
bankruptcy, Engler argued that the $5,500 was nondischargeable
36
as a debt induced by fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
Unpersuaded by Engler's argument, the Fourth Circuit Court
upheld the lower court's decision, finding that Van Steinburg's oral
the
respecting
"statements
were
misrepresentations
debtor's... financial condition" and thus were dischargeable
under the statute. 37 "A debtor's assertion that he owns certain
property free and clear of other liens is a statement respecting his
financial condition," wrote the Court. 38 "Indeed, whether his
assets are encumbered may be the most significant information
39
about his financial condition."
While the Court offered little by way of rationale, it is clear that
the wording of the text played a major role in the decision to
interpret the phrase broadly. For instance, relying on the wording
of the statute, the court rejected the idea that Congress intended
that the exception in § 523(a)(2)(A) only include formal financial
statements, writing "Congress did not speak in terms of financial
statements." 40 "Instead," wrote the court, "it referred to a much
the
'respecting
statements-those
of
class
broader
debtor's.., financial condition.'"41
33 744 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
3

Id.

35 Id.
36

Id.

37 Id.

However, had the statements made by Van Steinburg been in writing, they likely
would have been nondischargeable as written statements respecting financial condition
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). See id. at 1061 ("[T]he statement must be in writing to bar
the debtor's discharge.').
38 Id. at 1061.
39

Id.

40

Id. at 1060-61.

41 Id. at 1061.
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2. The Tenth Circuit's Narrow Approach. Twenty-one years
after the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Tenth Circuit became the
second circuit court to address 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)'s
"statement respecting ... financial condition 42 in Cadwell v.
Joelson (In re Joelson).43 After a thorough analysis of the issue,
the Tenth Circuit adopted a narrower interpretation of the
44
statute.
In Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), the creditor, Cadwell, a
retired, single man, mortgaged his home to loan Joelson, a
waitress he met at a cafe, $50,000 to rescue her home from
foreclosure. 45 Joelson told Cadwell that her brother was going to
loan her the money later and that she would pay him back as soon
as she received the money from her brother. 46 She also promised
to secure the loan by providing Cadwell with collateralmisrepresenting that she owned multiple other homes, a motel,
and a number of antique vehicles. 47 When Cadwell filed suit to
4
collect on the loan, Joelson filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. 8
Working deliberately through the statute's text, structure, policy
and legislative history, as well as recent trends in case law, the Tenth
Circuit decided to apply the strict interpretation of "statement
respecting... financial condition." 49 According to the Court, such
statements "purport to present a picture of the debtor's overall
financial health" and are "analogous to balance sheets, income
statements, statements of changes in overall financial position, or
income and debt statements that present the debtor or insider's net
worth, overall financial health, or equation of assets and liabilities."50
42 In a 2004 case, Land Inv. Club, Inc. v. Lauer (In re Lauer), the Eighth Circuit
recognized the existence of disagreement over "statement respecting .. financial condition"
and seemed to apply a strict interpretation, but made no attempt to clarify its stance on the
issue-limiting its finding to "these circumstances." See 371 F.3d 406, 413-14 (8th Cir.
2004) (finding that the acquisition of property through the concealment of material changes
in a company's asset mix is fraud and nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)).
43 427 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 2005).
44 Id. at 706 ("[W]e believe that the strict interpretation of the phrase is most consistent
with the text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress's intent as expressed in the
legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) & (B), and case law.').
45 Id. at 703.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48

Id. at 703-04.

49 Id. at 714.
50 Id.
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Thus, because Joelson's misrepresentations merely addressed specific
assets (homes, motel, and antique cars) and a specific stream of
income (loan from her brother), they were not "statements
respecting... financial condition" under a strict interpretation of the
phrase and, accordingly, were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
51
§ 523(a)(2)(A).
3. The Fifth Circuit's Narrow Approach. The Fifth Circuit
delivered the most recent circuit court decision favoring a narrow
approach when it decided Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi) in 2012.52
In that case, Becnel held a $150,000 promissory note guaranteed
by Bandi. 53 Becnel argued that the debt was nondischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) because Bandi had obtained the
loan by falsely representing that he owned or co-owned a number
of properties, both commercial and residential. 54 Bandi, on the
other hand, asserted that under a proper interpretation of the
statute his oral representations were oral "statement[s]
55
respecting... financial condition" and thus dischargeable.
of
"statement[s]
narrow
reading
Employing
a
respecting... financial condition," the Court found for Becnelagreeing with the Tenth Circuit's assessment that "statements
within the meaning of that section 'are those that purport to
present a picture of the debtor's overall financial health.' "56
According to the Court, "[a] representation that one owns a
particular residence or a particular commercial property says
nothing about the overall financial condition of the person making
the representation or the ability to repay debt."57 Because Bandi's
statements focused on his ownership of specific assets, they did not
adequately represent Bandi's overall financial health or net worth,
and thus did not qualify as "statement[s] respecting ... financial
condition."5 8

51 See id. at 714-15 (finding Joelson's representations about specific assets "do not
constitute a statement as to Joelson's overall financial health" and "a statement about one
part of Joelson's income flow-the flow of funds from her brother-does not reflect Joelson's
overall financial health).
52 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012).
63 Id. at 673.
64

Id.

65
67

Id. at 674.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 676.

58

Id. at 678-79.

56
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III. ANALYSIS
Four of the most prominent and persuasive arguments for the
narrow interpretation of § 523(a)(2)'s "financial condition"
language are those based on (1) the ordinary commercial usage of
the phrase "statement respecting ...financial condition," (2) the
legislative history of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Code, (3) policy
considerations, and (4) the Supreme Court's general discussion of
the statute in Field v. Mans. I will address each argument below.
A. ANYTHING BUT THE PLAIN MEANING

When bankruptcy courts consider a question of statutory
interpretation, they generally look first to the text of the statute to
determine whether it offers a plain meaning. 59 Because the words
"statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition" are left undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, 60 courts
supporting a narrow interpretation of the phrase have looked to
While courts have
the text's ordinary commercial usage. 61
typically agreed that the phrase does not require a specific
formality such as an actual balance sheet or an income
statement, 62 they have concluded that an ordinary commercial
statutory
language,
"statement
understanding
of
the
respecting... financial condition," requires a representation of the
63
debtor's overall net worth.

59 Norcross v. Ransford (In re Ransford), 202 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (citing
United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989)).
60 See Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 706 (10th Cir. 2005) ("The
Bankruptcy Code does not offer a definition of the phrase 'respecting the debtor's... financial
condition.' Nor does the Code even offer a definition of the term 'financial condition.' ");
523.08(2)(c) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
COLLUER ON BANKRUPTCY
("Neither the phrase 'respecting the debtor's ...financial condition' nor the term 'financial
condition' is defined.').
61 See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Chivers (In re Chivers), 275 B.R. 606, 615
(Bankr. D. Utah 2002) (explaining that courts supporting a narrow interpretation first
argue that the "normal commercial meaning and usage of 'statement' in connection with
'financial condition'" supports their interpretation); In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676 ("[The
phrase 'a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition' as used in
'").
[the statute] was meant to embody terms commonly understood in commercial usage.
62 Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
63 See, e.g., Jokay Co. v. Mercado (In re Mercado), 144 B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992);
Bal-Ross Grocers, Inc. v. Sansoucy (In re Sansoucy), 136 B.R. 20, 23 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992).
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In looking to ordinary commercial usage, courts have focused
particular attention on the term "financial condition."
For
instance, the Fifth Circuit has said that "financial condition" has a
"readily understood meaning"-it means the "general overall
financial condition of an entity or individual, that is, the overall
64
value of property and income as compared to debt and liabilities."
This definition is consistent with Black's Law Dictionary. When
looking up the phrase "statement of financial condition," readers
are directed to the term "balance sheet"-defined as "[a] statement
of the entity's current financial position, disclosing the value of the
'65
entity's assets, liabilities, and owners' equity.
The Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts find further support for this
definition in 11 U.S.C. §,101(32) of the Bankruptcy Code-where
"financial condition" is used to define the term "insolvent."66 The
provision states:
(32) The term "insolvent" means(A) with reference to an entity other than a
partnership and a municipality, financial
condition such that the sum of such entity's
debts is greater than all of such entity's
property...
(B) with reference to a partnership, financial
condition such that the sum of such
partnership's debts is greater than the
aggregate of, at a fair valuation(i)
all
of
such
partnership's
property...
(C) with reference to a municipality, financial
condition such that the municipality is-

In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676.
Velten, supra note 23, at 596 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
6 See In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676 ("We find support for construing 'financial
condition'.. . to connote the overall net worth of an entity or individual in other provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.'); Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 706-07 (10th
Cir. 2005) ('CThe Code's use of the term 'financial condition' in [11 U.S.C. § 101(32)] suggests
that the term ... in § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) also relates to a debtor's net worth or overall
financial condition.").
64
6
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(i) generally not paying its debts as
they become due unless such debts are
the subject of a bona fide dispute; or
(ii) unable to pay its debts as they
67
become due.
In subsections (A) and (B), the Bankruptcy Code defines
insolvency as a "financial condition" in which an entity's debt
outweighs all of its assets, while in subsection (C), insolvency is a
"financial condition" in which a municipality is unable to pay its
debts as they become due. Thus, when used in §101(32), "financial
condition" either refers to an entity's net worth (difference between
overall assets and liabilities) or an entity's cash flow (total amount
of money coming in and out of the company).
While the Bankruptcy Code does not actually define "financial
condition" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(32), the Tenth Circuit argues that
the Code's use of the term in § 101(32) should impact the
68
interpretation of "financial condition" in § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B).
Since "financial condition" refers to an entity's overall net worth or
cash flow in § 101(32), it follows that the same phrase found in
another section of the Bankruptcy Code (§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B))
would again refer to one's overall financial condition. And if
"financial condition" refers to one's overall financial condition, it
69
cannot simultaneously refer to one's individual assets.
This line of reasoning, which examines the plain meaning of the
statute, is central to decisions made in support of a narrow
interpretation of the phrase "statement respecting ... financial
Most
condition."70
This reasoning, however, has flaws.
67 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2012) (emphasis added).

68 See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 706 ("[T]he Code's definition of the term 'insolvent'
provides tangential support for the proposition that the phrase 'respecting the
debtor's... financial condition' should be construed as relating only to information on the
debtor's overall financial condition.").
69 See In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676 ("A representation that one owns a particular
residence or a particular commercial property says nothing about the overall financial
condition of the person making the representation or the ability to repay debt. The property
about which a representation is made could be entirely encumbered, or outstanding
undisclosed liabilities of the person making the representation could be far more than the
value of the property about which a representation is made.").
70 See, e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Chivers (In re Chivers), 275 B.R. 606,
615 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002) (explaining that cases supporting a narrow view of the phrase
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importantly, the argument conflates "financial condition" with
"statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
That "financial condition" has a readily accepted
condition."
meaning in commercial usage cannot be the end of a textual
analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). "Financial condition"'
The meaning of "financial
is but one piece of the statute.
condition" must be placed in the context of the entire phrase at
issue. Consequently, the more appropriate question is: What does
"statement respecting ... financial condition" mean?
Courts advocating for a broad view of the phrase have also
looked to the plain meaning of the text, but have arrived at a
different conclusion. 71 Ironically, the difference in interpretation
might be less about the term "financial condition" than the
Unlike their
mundane word that precedes it-statement.
counterparts who prefer to limit "statement" to its meaning within
a financial context, courts supporting a broad view have defined
"statement" simply as an "utterance of some kind."72 Courts note
that Congress could have used the term "financial statement," but
Instead, Congress used only the word
elected not to. 73
"statement."74
sense, a "statement respecting the
In its plainest
debtor's ... financial condition" cannot possibly be constrained to
false financial statements such as balance sheets that create a full
"statement respecting... financial condition" generally make four arguments-the first
being an argument based on the "normal commercial meaning and usage" of the phrase).
71 Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (In re Appling), 848 F.3d 953, 960 (11th Cir.
2017); Armbrustmacher v. Redburn (In re Redburn), 202 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1996).
72 In re Redburn, 202 B.R. at 925.
73 See id. at 927 ("Congress could have elected to use the more precise term 'financial
statement' but did not. Instead it used the word 'statement' and, later in the same
sentence, limited its meaning by adding, 'respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition.' "); Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1040, 1060-61 (4th
Cir. 1984) (highlighting the fact that "Congress did not speak in terms of financial
statements," but "referred to a much broader class of statements-those 'respecting the
debtor's. . . financial condition.'"); see also Norcross v. Ransford (In re Ransford), 202 B.R.
1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) ("[The plain language of § 523(a)(2) does not require that the
'statement' be a traditional financial statement. And the statute provides no further
guidance."); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Priestley (In re Priestly), 201 B.R. 875, 882 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1996) ("[Broad approach] is supported by the Code's language, which refers not just to
financial statements, but to the broader category of statements 'respecting the
debtor's ... financial condition.' ").
74 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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financial picture of assets and liabilities. Though these types of
documents would undoubtedly fit within the scope of the phrase, a
plain reading requires a much broader application. Further, any
attempt at narrowing the phrase to apply only to financial
statements like balance sheets raises an important question. If
Congress intended the scope of the phrase to be so limited, what is
the point in contemplating a situation in which this type of
statement would not be in writing? By requiring that "statements
respecting the debtor's ... financial condition" be in writing to
properly fall under § 523(a)(2)(B),
Congress must have
contemplated that some statements of this type would not be in
writing. Thus, if Congress intended that the phrase only apply
when a debtor lied on a financial statement, then requiring that
the statement be in writing is relatively absurd considering the
75
relative non-existence of oral balance sheets.
What then did Congress have in mind? Though it is possible to
imagine a conversation in which a debtor provides a complete, yet
fraudulent, oral accounting of her assets and liabilities in order to
obtain credit, the infrequency with which these types of
conversations take place could not justify the inclusion of a writing
requirement in § 523(a)(2)(B). Based on the wording of the phrase,
it is more likely that Congress contemplated oral statements that
related to or affected the debtor's overall financial condition, but
which, in and of themselves, did not provide sufficient information
to be considered a complete statement of assets and liabilities.
Accordingly, courts applying a broad reading of the statute have
found that a debtor's representation that she owns a specific asset,
especially an asset free and clear of any encumbrances, is
undoubtedly a "statement respecting... financial condition." 76
"Indeed," explains the Fourth Circuit, "whether [a debtor's] assets

75 Cf. Zimmerman v. Soderland (In re Soderlund), 197 B.R. 742, 746 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996) ("[R]estricting the requirement for a writing to statements reflecting 'an entity's
overall financial health' narrows the scope of the provision to only the most deliberate false
statements." (citations omitted)). In fact, such a narrow interpretation arguably has the
effect of making 523(a)(2)(A)'s "statement... respecting financial condition" completely
impotent.
76 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Priestly (In re Priestly), 201 B.R. 875, 882 (Bankr. D. Del.
1996) (noting that a broad interpretation "encompasses statements concerning the condition
or quality of a single asset or liability impacting on the debtor's financial picture").
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are encumbered may be the most significant information about his
77
financial condition."
While courts supporting a narrow interpretation purport to
honor the plain meaning of the statute, there is nothing intuitive
about limiting the meaning of "statement respecting ... financial
condition" to formal financial statements. And though it is
possible that Congress intended to narrowly limit the phrase's
application so that only formal financial statements are filtered
through § 523(a)(2)(B), a plain reading of the text simply does not
provide support for that interpretation.
B. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (OR LACK THEREOF)

Because courts have been unable to agree on the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code's text, the statute's legislative history has
But while courts
become an important area of analysis. 78
supporting a narrow view have found support for their
interpretation in the legislative history, 79 courts employing a broad
80
interpretation have found the legislative history less convincing.
In its current form, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) dates back
to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.81 But the predecessors to
both subsections (A) and (B) have been a part of the Code since the
The precursor to
beginning of the twentieth century.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) was originally added in 1903 as an amendment to
§ 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.82 The amendment
provided that '"iabilities [or debts] for obtaining property by false
77 In re Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d at 1061.
78 See Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 707 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) ("We may
examine this legislative history because this is not a case where the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code is clear from the statute's text.").
79 See id. at 707 ('The legislative history of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) corroborates the view
that the strict definition of 'respecting the debtor's ... financial condition' is most in
keeping with Congress's intent in promulgating these provisions."); Weiss v. Alicea (In re
Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 503 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[The strict interpretation is] faithful to
the intent of Congress as reflected in the statements of the sponsors.").
80 See In re Soderlund, 197 B.R. at 745 ("i do not find [the legislative history] helpful or
persuasive in reaching a decision."); Armbrustmacher v. Redburn (In re Redburn), 202 B.R.
917, 926-27 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996) (stating "the legislative history is silent as to the
preferred reading" and agreeing with In re Soderlund in finding it "neither helpful nor
persuasive...").
81 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 64 (1995) (citing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as
the "most recent codification" of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)).
82 Id. at 64.
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pretenses or false representations" could not be discharged by the
bankrupt, who remained responsible for payment.8 3 Importantly,
however, the amendment provided no exception or qualification of
§ 17(a)(2) that would allow discharge for "statement[s] respecting
the debtor's ... financial condition." The phrase is completely
absent from the statute.8 4 This section of the Code remained
largely unchanged until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, when
it was recodified as § 523(a)(2)(A) and amended to reflect the
current language of the statute.8 5 "Thus," according to the
Supreme Court, "since 1903 the statutory language ...progressed
from 'false pretenses or false representations' to 'false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respecting the debtor's or an insider'sfinancial condition.' "86
Similarly, Congress added the precursor to § 523(a)(2)(B) to the
Bankruptcy Code via a 1903 amendment.8 7 Subsection (B),
however, "is the product of more active evolution."88
Its
predecessor provided grounds to completely deny the bankrupt any
relief through discharge if the debtor used a materially false
written statement to obtain property.8 9
The Tenth Circuit
provides a nice summary of the effects of the aforementioned 1903
amendments: "as of 1903, if a debtor had obtained property on
credit through the use of an oral misrepresentation, that
particulardebt would be excepted from discharge; if a debtor had
obtained property on credit through the use of a written

83 Id. at 64-65 (quoting the Bankruptcy Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797-98
§ 17(a)(2) (1903)).
84 Bankruptcy Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Ch. 487 32 Stat. 797, 798 § 17(a)(2) (1903) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012)).
85 Field, 516 U.S. at 65. The Supreme Court further explains in footnote five that the
only change to § 17(a)(2) between 1903 and 1978 was the replacement of "obtaining
property" with "obtaining money or property" in 1938. Id. at 65 n.5.
8 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
87 In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708.
88 Field, 516 U.S. at 65.
89 See id. (explaining that the predecessor to § 523(a)(2)(B) "barred any discharge by a
bankrupt who obtained property by use of a materially false statement in writing made for
the purpose of obtaining the credit); see also In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708 ('The
predecessor to § 523(a)(2)(B) was a separate provision that provided grounds for a court to
deny the discharge of all of a debtor's obligations, not merely to deny the discharge of a
particular debt obtained through the use of a materially false statement in writing.").
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misrepresentation, none of the debtor's debts could be
discharged."90
The only major amendment between 1903 and 1978 came in
1960, when Congress combined the language of § 523(a)(2)(B)'s
predecessor with that of § 523(a)(2)(A)'s predecessor under the
newly revised § 17(a)(2). 91 Congress also modified the language of
First,
§ 523(a)(2)(B)'s predecessor in three significant ways.
Congress removed the language that barred discharge of all of a
bankrupt's debts when the bankrupt used a false written
statement to acquire property-meaning only the debts specifically
obtained through the use of a false written statement were denied
discharge. 92 Second, Congress added a requirement that the
debtor intentionally deceive the creditor. 93 And third, for the debt
to be nondischargeable, the creditor must have relied upon the
94
false written statement.
These modifications, undeniably favoring debtors, were largely
a response to concerns of Congress that creditors were abusing
debtors by allowing and even encouraging them to submit false
financial statements with credit applications so that the creditor
would receive greater protection in the event of the debtor's
subsequent default. 95 This concern remained on the minds of
90 In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708 (emphasis added).
91 See Field, 516 U.S. at 65 n.6 ('The 1960 amendments ... transferred the language on
false financial statements by individuals from § 14... to § 17(a)(2) ....Thus, as of 1960 the
relevant portion of § 17(a)(2) provided that discharge would not release a bankrupt from
debts that 'are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false
representations, or for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or
renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting [the
bankrupt's] financial condition made or published or caused to be made or published in any
manner whatsoever with intent to deceive.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Act of July 12,
1960, Pub. L. 86-621, 74 Stat. 408-09)); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708 (explaining that the
statutory language addressing written statements of financial condition was combined with
the precursor of § 523(a)(2)(A)).
92 See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708 ("[T]he statutory language addressing [written
financial statements] was combined with the precursor of § 523(a)(2)(A) so that only the
specific debt incurred as a result of the false written financial statement was not
dischargeable.").
9- Field, 516 U.S. at 65.
94 Id.
95 Quoting legislative documents describing the 1960 amendments, the Tenth Circuit

further highlights the practices of abusive creditors: "'[A]rmed with a false financial
statement,' these creditors had 'a powerful weapon with which to intimidate a debtor into
entering an agreement in which the creditor agree[d] not to oppose the discharge in return
for the debtor's agreement to pay the debt in full after discharge.'" In re Joelson, 427 F.3d
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members of Congress in 1978 when the Code was again amended
and given its present form and substance. 96 Thus, under the
current statute, which was only slightly modified in substance
from its 1960 predecessor, 97 if a debtor makes a false "statement
respecting the debtor's ... financial condition," the more rigorous
§ 523(a)(2)(B) is controlling-requiring that the creditor not only
show that the debtor lied, but that the statement was in writing,
materially false, reasonably relied upon, and made with the intent
98
to deceive.
Though the intent of Congress is relatively clear in instituting
the additional requirements of false "statements respecting the
debtor's.., financial condition" in the 1960 amendment and
maintaining those additional requirements in § 523(a)(2)(B) of the
1978 amendment, what remains unclear is the intent of Congress
in the 1978 construction of § 523(a)(2)(A). 99 Courts employing a
narrow interpretation of the statute have argued that "there is no
indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to
remove from the coverage of § 523(a)(2)(A) any of the debts based
on oral misrepresentations going to financial condition .... ,,100
The only goal was to fix a very specific problem caused by
predatory lenders, and to otherwise leave § 523(a)(2)(A) and its
predecessor unaffected. 10 1 But while Congress' intention to fix the
predatory lending problems through the additional reliance
requirement in § 523(a)(2)(B) is clear, the conclusion that Congress

at 708 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 1688, at 2-3 (1960)) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 111, at 2-3 (1959)).
96 Field, 516 U.S. at 76-77 ('The House Report on the [1978] Act suggests that Congress
wanted to moderate the burden on individuals who submitted false financial statements,
not because lies about financial condition are less blameworthy than others, but because the
relative equities might be affected by practices of consumer finance companies, which
sometimes have encouraged such falsity by their borrowers for the very purpose of
insulating their own claims from discharge.").
97 See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 709 ("The House Committee on the Judiciary noted that
the bill that formed the backbone of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) was 'modified only slightly' from
its predecessor." (citation omitted)).
98 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012); see supranotes 27-28 and accompanying text.
99 The statute denies discharge of a debt obtained by "false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
100 In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 709.
101See id. at 709-10 (stating that § 523(a)(2)(B) was not designed to "undermine the
coverage of § 523(a)(2)(A) and its predecessors").
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had no intention of changing the predecessor
to § 523(a)(2)(A) is
10 2
history.
legislative
the
from
not apparent
There is at least one significant problem for courts relying on
the legislative history (or lack thereof) to support the contention
that Congress intended to leave the predecessor to § 523(a)(2)(A)
unaffected by the 1978 Amendment-Congress's unambiguous
changes to the statute's language. Before the 1978 Amendment to
the Code, the statute prohibited the discharge of any debts
incurred in obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false
representations. 103 After the Amendment, however, the statute
prohibited discharge of debts obtained through false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud other than a statement
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.10 4 The
difference is obvious. With the italicized language added to the
1978 Amendment, Congress carved out an exception to
§ 523(a)(2)(A)'s predecessor. Even proponents of the narrow view,
who would severely limit the size of that exception, must admit
that an exception was created-a clear indication that Congress
did in fact intend to alter the application of § 523(a)(2)(A)'s
predecessor.
Further, the legislative history is notably silent as to the proper
interpretation of the exception added in § 523(a)(2)(A). 10 5 Because
the legislative history fails to provide guidance as to the intent of
Congress in excepting oral "statement[s] respecting the
the
typically
from
condition"
debtor's ... financial
nondischargeable debts obtained through false representations, it
is incapable of resolving the interpretive split that has developed
around the phrase. Accordingly, courts supporting a broad view of
"statement respecting ...financial condition" have found the
10 6
legislative history largely unhelpful.

102 See Ambrustmacher v. Redburn (In re Redburn), 202 B.R. 917, 927 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1996) (arguing that Congress's intent regarding the additional reliance requirement added to
§ 523(a)(2)(B) does not solve the issue of the meaning of "statements respecting .. financial
condition" in § 523(a)(2)(A)).
103 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
14 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
105 See In re Redburn, 202 B.R. at 927 ("Nowhere in the legislative history does Congress
define the word 'statement' or the phrase at issue.").
106 Id.; Zimmerman v. Soderlund (In re Soderlund), 197 B.R. 742, 745 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996).
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C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The recent trend of courts moving away from a broad
interpretation of "statement respecting ...financial condition" is
easiest to rationalize based on the policy concern that this
interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) will allow dishonest
debtors to take advantage of debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws to
the detriment of an unsuspecting creditor.
This narrative,
however, does not create a full and complete picture of the policy
concerns at issue when choosing an interpretive framework for the
statute.
At the outset, two well-established policy goals should frame
any discussion about the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). The
first is the overarching aim of bankruptcy law-that debtors be
provided a "fresh start," free from the shackles of financial
liability. 10 7 This goal, however, does not extend without limitation.
The fraud exception found in § 523(a)(2) is one such limitationrepresenting the belief that only '"honest but unfortunate" debtors
deserve a "fresh start."'108 Nevertheless, the "fresh start" policy is
still an important consideration in the application of § 523(a)(2).
For example, the force of this policy is particularly evident in the
level of deference given a debtor whose debt is potentially
nondischargeable under any number of exceptions enumerated in
§ 523. Rather than leave the decision of how and when to apply
the exceptions in equipoise, these exceptions are to be "strictly
construed in favor of the debtor."' 09 Thus, even where Congress
has carved out exceptions to the Bankruptcy Code's preference for
dischargeability, the "fresh start" policy continues to have an
impact.
The second policy goal, that debtors not fall prey to the fraud
exception, is much narrower in scope. As discussed previously, the
evolution and development of § 523(a)(2), enacted in 1978, was in
large part an attempt by Congress to protect debtors from a
particular predatory lending practice.11 0
Congress explicitly

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
In re Redburn, 202 B.R. at 923 (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). See
also supranotes 3-5 and accompanying text.
109 In re Redburn, 202 B.R. at 923.
110 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
107
108
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expressed this policy concern in the House Report on the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978.111
It is a frequent practice for consumer finance
companies to take a list from each loan applicant of
other loans or debts that the applicant has
outstanding. While the consumer finance companies
use these statements in evaluating the credit risk,
very often the statements are used as a basis for a
false financial statement exception to discharge. The
forms that the applicant fills out often have too little
space for a complete list of debts. Frequently, a loan
applicant is instructed by a loan officer to list only a
few or only the most important of his debts. Then, at
the bottom of the form, the phrase 'I have no other
debts' is either printed on the form, or the applicant is
instructed to write the phrase in his own
handwriting.112
As a matter of policy, Congress was unwilling to stand by and
allow creditors to take advantage of the fraud exception to
discharge. Thus, in its current form, § 523(a)(2) was designed to
make it more difficult for creditors to claim that a bankruptcy
fraud and, as a result,
petitioner's debts were obtained through
13
statute.
nondischargeable under the
With these well-established policies as a backdrop, it is
important to understand the primary policy argument raised in
favor of a narrow interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s
"statement respecting a debtor's . . . financial condition." Courts
supporting a narrow view are concerned with dishonest debtors
using the exception in § 523(a)(2)(A) to discharge fraudulently
4 This
obtained debt owed to trusting, unsophisticated lenders."
111See supra note 95.
112 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 77 (1995).
113 See id. at 76-77 (explaining that Congress intended to "moderate the burden on
individuals who submitted false financial statements').
114 See, e.g., Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 713 (10th Cir. 2005) ("If
drawn too broadly, the definition will sweep in many oral misrepresentations, and therefore
exclude them from coverage under subdivision (A). These debtors will thereby escape the
anti-discharge provisions completely." (quoting Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492,
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sentiment is best described by a bankruptcy court in the District of
Massachusetts:
If I were to hold that a statement which reflected any
aspect of a debtor's financial condition is the basis for a
nondischargeability action only if in writing, egregious
frauds could be perpetrated upon naive lenders. These
would most likely be amateur lenders - friends,
family, and the like - rather than banks and other
institutional lenders, which generally require financial
information upon which they intend to rely to be in
115
writing.
This concern is aptly illustrated by Cadwell v. Joelson (In re
116
Joelson), a case described in Part II of this Note.
Because of the way the statute is structured, courts are faced
with a choice-either expand the scope of "statement[s]
respecting.., financial condition" (funneling a greater number of
statements through the more rigorous elements of § 523(a)(2)(B))
and necessarily allow a greater number of dishonest debtors to
discharge their debt in bankruptcy or, in the alternative, severely
limit the scope of the phrase so that very few statements are
assessed under § 523(a)(2)(B). 117 Naturally, many courts have
chosen the latter, hoping to avoid the parade of horribles noted
above.118 Despite the growing disapproval of-and, as a result, the
lack of consideration given to-the broad interpretation, there are
multiple policy concerns that weigh in favor of a more expansive
view of the phrase "statement respecting.., financial condition."
First, the broad interpretation is consistent with both of the
express policy goals described at the outset of this section. As to
the Bankruptcy Code in general, the broad view furthers the "fresh
start" policy because it errs on the side of debtors-effectively

502-04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990))); In re Redburn, 202 B.R. at 925 ("The main concern
expressed [by courts favoring a narrow interpretation] is that egregious frauds--oral
misrepresentations of a debtor's financial condition-will go unaddressed under a more
expansive reading.').
115 Zimmerman v. Soderlund (In re Soderlund), 197 B.R. 742, 746 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
116 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
118In re Soderlund, 197 B.R. at 746.
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increasing the number of debts that will be dischargeable in
Additionally, following a broad interpretation
bankruptcy.
furthers the goal of protecting debtors from potentially predatory
lending practices-the primary aim of Congress in designing and
enacting § 523(a)(2)(B). 119 While employing a broad interpretation
makes creditors more vulnerable to oral fraud, it simultaneously
provides additional protection to vulnerable debtors. Because the
broad approach increases the number of representations that
qualify as "statements respecting... financial condition," a
greater number of debts (and the representations leading to these
debts) will be examined under the heightened scrutiny of
Thus, by casting a wider net, the broad
§ 523(a)(2)(B). 120
interpretation does a more thorough job of accomplishing
Congress's aim of protecting debtors from deceitful lending
practices.
Second, following a broad interpretation would likely create a
better lending process by incentivizing lenders to require that
statements relating to the debtor's ability to pay be in writing.
Consider the mechanics of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). Under the matrix
created by Congress, written misrepresentations "respecting...
financial condition" are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(B),
while oral misrepresentations "respecting... financial condition"
are fully dischargeable under the exception carved out of
§ 523(a)(2)(A). 121 Because a broad interpretation enlarges the scope
of "statement[s] respecting... financial condition," a greater
number of misrepresentations (both oral and written) will be
funneled through this matrix. The natural result is an increase in
the number of oral misrepresentations that are dischargeable
through bankruptcy-and, consequently, an increase in the number
of creditors who will be left without a remedy against dishonest
debtors. 122 This situation, however, is not without benefit. The

119 See supranote 95 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (explaining the absolute dichotomy
created by the structure of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)).
122 See Armbrustmacher v. Redburn (In re Redburn), 202 B.R. 917, 926 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1996) ("Under a limited reading, subsection (A) will apply to more creditor/plaintiffs,
as fewer claims will fall under subsection (A)'s statement of financial condition exclusion.
On the other hand, under an expansive reading, more claims will be actionable under
subsection (B).").
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seemingly grim consequences that flow from a broad interpretation
of "statement representing ... financial condition" will likely
necessitate a more responsible creditor--one that is not content to
rely on oral representations of debtors, but is vigilant in requiring a
writing.
Further, by incentivizing creditors to require a writing, the
employment of a broad interpretation results in a lending process
that is more transparent and easier to adjudicate. Because false
oral statements "respecting ... financial condition" will be per se
dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A), "bankruptcy courts will be
called upon less often to preside over 'swearing matches,' where
parties' assertions are contradictory but no written evidence is
presented." 123 If, however, the scope of the phrase continues to be
narrowly interpreted, courts will be forced to determine not only
what was said and when, but also the appropriateness of the
creditor's reliance on the oral statements. 124 Thus, for the sake of
clarity and efficiency, it is reasonable to require creditorsspecifically, those that wish to be protected against fraud in
bankruptcy-to take the extra precaution of getting the debtor's
representations in writing if they relate to her financial condition.
Finally, a narrow interpretation, when carried to its logical end,
leads to absurd results. Imagine for instance that a person is
seeking a loan to pursue a business opportunity. In an effort to
obtain the loan, she orally misrepresents her financial position,
claiming that she owns two unencumbered properties, has a
checking account with a $15,000 balance, and no debts to speak of.
Assuming these statements "purport to present a picture of the
debtor's overall financial health," they would qualify as a
"statement respecting ... financial condition."1 25 Because the
statements are not in writing, they would be fully dischargeable,
falling under the exception in § 523(a)(2)(A). 12 6 However, if the
potential debtor had told a less complete lie, the debt would be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) because it would not fit the
narrowly defined "statement representing ... financial condition."

123

Id.

124

See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1995) (finding that § 523(a)(2)(A) "requires

justifiable... reliance').
125 Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th Cir. 2005).
126 See supra notes 30-31 and the accompanying text.
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For example, had she merely represented that she owned two
properties-making no mention of potential encumbrances-the
debt would almost surely be nondischargeable as a fraudulent
statement not "respecting ... financial condition." Thus, under a
and calculated the
narrow view, the more complete
misrepresentation, the more likely the creditor will be left without
a remedy against discharge.
Contrary to the assertions of courts holding a narrow view,
employing a broad interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s
"statement respecting ... financial condition" is not bad policy.
Not only is it consistent with the express policy aims of Congress,
but it encourages a better, more dependable lending process by
incentivizing creditors to be more responsible in their reliance on
debtors' representations. Further, while a narrow interpretation
has the potential to produce absurd results, the broad
interpretation is predictable and lends itself to more efficient
adjudication. It is true that a broad reading of the statute will
enable some dishonest debtors to walk away from fraudulently
obtained debt through bankruptcy. Despite its emotional appeal,
however, it is a single concern that must be weighed against a
number of others supporting a broad interpretation of "statement
respecting... financial condition."
D. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS

The Supreme Court's treatment of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s
"statement respecting ... financial condition" has become one of
the most significant factors in the recent trend toward a narrow
interpretation. Though the phrase itself was not the issue before
the Court, lower courts supporting a narrow view have found the
Supreme Court's opinion particularly helpful in rebutting what is
likely the strongest argument in favor of a broad interpretationthe plain meaning of the text. 127 However, despite the weight
given the Supreme Court's discussion in Field v. Mans, the Court's

See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Chivers (In re Chivers), 275 B.R. 606, 615
(Bankr. D. Utah 2002) ("mhe strongest argument in favor of the broad interpretation-that
had Congress wanted § 523(a)(2)(B) limited to false financial statements, it would have so
drafted the statute-is gutted by the Supreme Court's repeated statements in Field v.
Mans.").
127
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understanding of the phrase "statement respecting... financial
condition" is altogether unclear.
In Field v. Mans, the Supreme Court was tasked with
determining the level of reliance necessary to sustain the
nondischargeability of debt obtained by a debtor's fraudulent
In the process of
misrepresentation under § 523(a)(2)(A). 128
deciding that "justifiable" reliance-as opposed to "reasonable"
reliance, the express standard in § 523(a)(2)(B)-was the proper
standard, the court analyzed these "two close statutory
companions barring discharge." 129 While the Court clearly made
no discernable effort to define "statement respecting ...financial
condition," the phrase is frequently referenced in the opinion.
Courts supporting a narrow interpretation have found these
references particularly insightful. 130
For instance, at multiple points in the opinion, the Court uses
the phrase "financial statement" or "statement of financial
condition" when referencing the statutory language "statement
According to the Tenth
respecting... financial condition."131
Circuit, the "substitution of these established phrases for the more
unusual 'statement respecting the debtor's ...financial condition'
implies that this unusual phrase should be given a meaning
similar to that of the established phrases-not an expansive
meaning that might embrace statements respecting only a single
aspect of the debtor's financial condition." 132 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit clings to a section of the opinion in which the Court seems
to equate a "statement respecting. .. financial condition" with a
statement about one's bank balance. 133 When further analyzed,
however, these references fail to clarify the phrase.
Take, for instance, one of the Court's most direct and clearly
articulated statements about the application of § 523(a)(2)(A) and

128

Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61 (1995).

129

Id. at 66.

130 See, e.g., Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 675 ("[1In the course of its

examination of the interplay between § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(2)(B), the Court gave at
least some insight into the meaning of [the phrase]."); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 710
("Although [the] decision did not address the issue directly, it lends some support to the
notion that [the phrase] must relate to a debtor's overall financial health.").
131In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 710.
132 Id.

13 In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 675.
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(B). The Court notes that § 523(a)(2)(A) "applies expressly when
the debt follows a transfer of value or extension of credit induced
by falsity or fraud (not going to financial condition)," while
§ 523(a)(2)(B) applies "when the debt follows a transfer or
extension induced by a materially false and intentionally deceptive
written statement of financial condition."134 Here, the Court does
something confusing. When speaking about subsection (A), it
references falsities (or false statements) not going to financial
condition. When referencing subsection (B), however, the Court
refers to a written statement of financial condition. Courts
interpreting the phrase narrowly find significance in the language
the Court uses for subsection (B), believing it supports a limited
reading of the phrase. 135 The Court's reference to the same phrase
in subsection (A), however, undermines this line of reasoning
because the phrase "not going to financial condition" is essentially
the same as "not respecting ...financial condition." Thus, rather
than subtly signaling its interpretative preference, it seems more
likely
that
the
Court's
rephrasing
of
"statement
respecting ... financial condition" is simply stylistic.
Further, that the Court seems to equate "statement
respecting... financial condition" to a statement about one's bank
balance is equally unhelpful. First, it is surprising that this
reference is used in support of a narrow interpretation when it is
altogether unclear whether an oral statement concerning one's
bank balance would even fall within the scope of the narrow
interpretation, which requires that qualifying statements create a
complete picture of overall financial health. 36 To the contrary, a
statement about a bank balance, which is but a single input on the
balance sheet, is more akin to a statement about a single asset.
Even assuming a statement about a bank balance fits within the
narrow interpretation of the phrase, this line of reasoning falls flat
because the Supreme Court gives no indication in its opinion that
it intends to address the interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s
"statement respecting ... financial condition." This incidental

Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
13 See In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 710 (explaining how "statement of financial condition" is
a term with an "established meaning[ ]" that does not encompass "statements respecting
only a single aspect of the debtor's financial condition").
136 Id. at 705.
134
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reference, like the other references highlighted by courts adopting
a narrow view, is merely dictum-dictum not intended to address
the interpretation of this phrase.
a narrow interpretation
of
While
courts employing
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s "statement respecting.., financial
condition" continue to look to the Supreme Court's decision in
Field v. Mans for support, the Court's references to the phrase at
issue are largely unhelpful. While the Court uses a variety of
phrases to summarize and reference the cumbersome "statement
respecting ... financial condition," it is unclear what impact the
Court expects these references to have on the interpretation of the
phrase. What is clear, however, is that the Court did not intend to
define or otherwise make a determination about the interpretation
of the phrase. Thus, until the Supreme Court directly addresses
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s "statement respecting ...financial
condition," the conclusions lower courts draw from the passing
references in Field v. Mans are little more than guesswork.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Nearly four decades ago, Congress codified an exception to the
general rule that debts obtained by fraud are nondischargeable in
bankruptcy. The exception is evident in the language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523: "filing for bankruptcy does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt. . . to the extent obtained by false pretenses,
a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respectingthe debtor's... financial condition. 137 This was done in
response to concerns that creditors were abusing debtors by
allowing and even encouraging them to submit false financial
disclosures in credit applications so that the creditor could receive
greater protection in the event of default. 138 On this much, courts
agree. However, the intended scope of the phrase "statement
respecting ...financial condition" has been the subject of debate
over the last few decades-leading to an interpretive split among
the United States Courts of Appeals. 139

137

See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (emphasis added).

138 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
39

See supra Part H.B.
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Historically, a majority of courts employed a broad
oral
that
finding
phrase, 140
the
of
interpretation
misrepresentations concerning the ownership of specific assets
were "statement[s] respecting. . . financial condition." However,
as time passed, courts increasingly shifted to a narrow
interpretation of the phrase,14 1 such that only statements that
convey the debtor's overall net worth satisfy the exception in
§ 523(a)(2)(A). 142 These courts support this view with arguments
based on (1) the ordinary commercial usage of the phrase
"statement respecting ... financial condition," (2) the legislative
history of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy Code, (3) the
policy considerations, and (4) the Supreme Court's general
discussion of the statute in Field v. Mans. But as I have shown,
these arguments are inconclusive and largely unpersuasive.
The policy arguments raised by these courts provide the most
compelling justification for employing a narrow interpretation of
"statement respecting... financial condition."
The primary
concern is that innocent, amateur lenders will be abused by
dishonest debtors preying on their naivety and will receive no
protection in the event of default. This narrative has proved so
powerful that courts have bent the remaining legal arguments to
their will so as to overcome the text of the statute itself. Thus,
arguments based on passing comments by the Supreme Court, an
inconclusive legislative history, and a selective analysis of the text
had, prior to the recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit, become
the basis of a near consensus decision to abandon the historically
broad interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)'s "statement
respecting... financial condition."
Consider again the facts in Appling. 4 3 In this case, the
bankrupt party accumulated over $60,000 in unpaid legal fees.
Then, after the firm threatened to terminate representation, the
bankrupt party promised to pay the firm out of a large tax refund
he was set to receive within the year, despite knowledge that the
14 See Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (In re Appling), No. 3:15-CV-031 (CAR),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39958, at *7-8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2016), rev'd, 848 F.3d 953 (11th
Cir. 2017) (noting a majority of courts followed a broad interpretation in the past).
141 See id. (noting the shift from a historically broad interpretation of the statute, to the
more recent narrow/strict interpretation).
142 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
143 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39958.
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refund would not cover the entire bill. The firm continued their
representation, but the bankrupt party never paid the outstanding
fees and later filed for bankruptcy.
The issue throughout the case was whether the oral
misrepresentation about the tax refund was a "statement
respecting... financial condition."
If the district court had
employed a broad interpretation of the phrase, then it would have
been forced to allow the bankrupt party to discharge his debt to
the firm-a seemingly unfair result. Instead, the court adopted a
narrow view of the phrase, concluding that his misrepresentations
about the tax refund were not "statements respecting ... financial
condition," making the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
However, this decision by the district court, and its subsequent
reversal by the Eleventh Circuit, 144 show that the pendulum has
swung too far in favor of the narrow interpretation.
In Appling, unlike other cases employing the narrow
interpretation, there is no naive lender to protect. There is merely
a law firm that made a risky, and maybe even reckless, wager on
an individual who already owed $60,000 in unpaid legal fees.
Instead of cutting their losses, however, they dug in further,
placing their faith in a single, oral representation about a future
tax refund.
While this was likely just an error in judgment by the firm, one
could envision a scenario in which the firm made a very calculated
decision in continuing representation based on the oral
representation and nothing more. Under a narrow interpretation,
the firm was actually better protected by the bankruptcy statute
by relying on the oral statement rather than getting something in
writing.
Rather than the reasonable reliance required by
§ 523(a)(2)(B), the firm only needed to show justifiable reliancethe standard under § 523(a)(2)(A). 145 This is the very gaming-thesystem type of conduct that Congress wanted to prevent. Thus,
where the balance of power weighs in favor of the better-informed
creditor, as is the case in Appling, reckless behavior is rewarded
under a narrow reading of the statute.
While no one wants predatory borrowers to receive the benefits
of discharge in bankruptcy, courts must take note that Congress
144

Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (In re Appling), 848 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2017).

146 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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was not targeting predatory borrowers when it enacted
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). Congress was addressing another issuepredatory lenders. But because bankruptcy is a zero-sum game,
when a borrower receives protection, some lender must necessarily
lose it. This creates a tension between borrowers and lenders-a
tension to be managed by lawmakers and judges alike. However,
by choosing to substantially narrow the scope of § 523(a)(2)(A) and
(B)'s "statement respecting.., financial condition," courts have
largely ignored the plain meaning of the statute and now stand in
the shoes of lawmakers. At the very least, as is evident by the
Eleventh Circuit reversal in Appling, the interpretive split
requires a fresh examination, with full consideration given a
return to the broader interpretation of the phrase "statement
respecting... financial condition."
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